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ABSTRACT 
Although several studies have explored the nexus between corporate governance, 
audit quality and firm performance, there are still some areas that need further attention. 
These areas include (1) the mediating role of audit quality in the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance; (2) the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics such as board training, board nationality, board education, nomination 
committees and audit firm rotation on firm performance. Thus, the aims of the study are 
to examine (1) the impact of corporate governance on firm performance; (2) the 
relationship between corporate governance and audit quality; (3) the effect of audit 
quality on firm performance; and (4) the mediating role of audit quality in the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. To achieve these 
objectives, data were collected from 542 listed companies in Bursa Malaysia for the 
period of 2003 to 2012. This study used multiple regression for data analysis. The 
corporate governance characteristics examined includes board of directors (size, 
independence, training, nationality, education), audit committee (size, independence, 
meeting), and nomination committee (size, independence, experience). There are three 
proxies of audit quality employed which are audit fees, industry specialist auditor and 
audit firm rotation. Firms performance is measured using return on assets, return on 
equity and Tobin‘s-Q. In general, the results show that firms with effective corporate 
governance are more likely to have better performance and demand for higher audit 
quality. In addition, firms with higher audit quality are more likely to have better firm 
performance. The finding also shows that audit quality mediates the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. This means that there is direct relationship 
between firms with strong corporate governance and firm performance as well as 
indirect relationship between them through audit quality as a mediator. These findings 
are robust on other estimators and sensitivity analysis. The results provide several 
implications to investors, policy makers, researchers and regulators, especially with 
regard to enhancing firm performance, adopting mandatory audit firm rotation and board 
diversity under the current corporate governance principles. 
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ABSTRAK 
Walaupun banyak kajian telah menerokai huhungan antara tadbir urus korporat, 
kualiti audit dan prestasi firma, masih terdapat beberapa bidang kajian yang perlu diberi 
perhatian lanjut. Bidang-bidang ini termasuk (1) peranan pengantara kualiti audit dalam 
hubungan diantara tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi firma; (2) kesan ciri-ciri tadbir urus 
korporat seperti latihan lembaga pengarah, kewarganegaraan lembaga pengarah, 
pendidikan lembaga pengarah, jawatankuasa pencalonan dan tempoh hubungan firma 
audit ke atas prestasi syarikat. Oleh itu, matlamat kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji (1) 
kesan tadbir urus korporat ke atas prestasi firma; (2) hubungan antara tadbir urus 
korporat dan kualiti audit; (3) kesan kualiti audit keatas prestasi firma; dan (4) peranan 
pengantara kualiti audit dalam hubungan antara tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi firma. 
Untuk mencapai objektif ini, data telah dikumpul daripada 542 syarikat yang tersenarai 
di Bursa Malaysia bagi tempoh 2003 hingga 2012. Kajian ini menggunakan regresi 
berganda bagi menganalisis data. Ciri-ciri tadbir urus korporat yang dikaji termasuklah 
lembaga pengarah (saiz, kebebasan, latihan, kewarganegaraan, pendidikan), 
jawatankuasa audit (saiz, kebebasan, mesyuarat), dan Jawatankuasa pencalonan (saiz, 
kebebasan, pengalaman). Terdapat tiga proksi kualiti audit yang digunakan iaitu yuran 
audit, juruaudit pakar industri, dan tempoh hubungan firma audit. Prestasi firma diukur 
menggunakan pulangan atas aset, pulangan ke atas ekuiti dan Tobin‘s-Q. Secara umum, 
keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa firma yang bertadbir urus korporat yang 
berkesan lebih cenderung mempunyai prestasi firma yang lebih baik dan menghendaki 
kualiti audit yang lebih tinggi. Di samping itu, firma yang mempunyai kualiti audit yang 
lebih tinggi adalah lebih cenderung untuk mempunyai prestasi yang lebih baik. Dapatan 
kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa kualiti audit menjadi pengantara hubungan antara 
tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi firma. Ini bermakna bahawa terdapat hubungan 
langsung antara firma dengan tadbir urus korporat yang kukuh dan prestasi firma serta 
hubungan tidak langsung antara keduanya melalui kualiti audit sebagai pengantara. Hasil 
kajian ini adalah konsisten dengan penganggar lain dan analisis sensitiviti. Hasil kajian 
memberi beberapa implikasi kepada pelabur, pembuat dasar, penyelidik dan 
penguatkuasa terutamanya yang berkait dengan peningkatan prestasi firma, mengguna 
pakai tempoh hubungan firma audit mandatori dan kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah di 
bawah prinsip tadbir urus korporat semasa. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance characteristics on 
audit quality and firm performance as well as audit quality as mediator in the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The first section 
provides the background of the study and problem statement. The second section 
discusses the research objectives and research questions. The scope of study, 
significance of study, operational definition of study and structure of study are 
presented in the last section. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
Firm performance is one of the most important issues for investors, 
stakeholders and policy makers. According to Harrison and Wicks (2013) both 
current and future investors by evaluating the firm performance decide to continue 
their  investments in the company and they want to know if the company is profitable 
for investing or not. For improving firm performance, there are some indicators such 
as corporate governance and audit quality.  
Corporate governance refers to a set of systems, principles and processes by 
which a company is governed to achieve a company‘s goals and thus enhance firm 
performance (Clarke, 2007). Audit quality is defined as auditors who use some 
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techniques to recognize and report misstatements in clients‘ accounting systems. 
Most previous evidence suggests that lack of corporate governance and lack of audit 
quality are among the most important reasons for financial and corporate scandals 
(Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Haspeslagh, 2010;Soltani, 2014). This led to more 
attention by scholars in accounting and auditing to the necessity of identifying which 
characteristics of corporate governance are more effective in improving firm 
performance. Accordingly, countries began to establish corporate governance codes 
in order to protect the public from fraud and to guard against the eventual collapse of 
the economy. 
Corporate governance is an emerging and exciting issue in the Malaysian 
context. It became the focus of attention especially after Asian crisis 1997 and recent 
crisis and scandals such as Sime Bank and Malaysian Airlines (Mat Norwani et al., 
2011). The Malaysian government after 1998 decided to enhance good corporate 
governance by adopting corporate reforms that comprise the introduction of the new 
code of corporate governance. In March 2000 the first code was issued with aims to 
encourage the principle that companies use this code in their operations for reaching 
ideal governance framework. In October 2007, the second code of corporate 
governance was revised, and all listed firms in Bursa Malaysia have to follow the 
new code. In 2012, the Malaysian code on corporate governance (MCCG) was 
revised again and this new code emphasizes strengthening the structure of board and 
composition recognizing the director‘s role. Revising the code of corporate 
governance shows the importance of corporate governance for government, 
regulators as well as companies to use this code for achieving their goals. 
Recently, researchers have examined the direct effects of corporate 
characteristics on audit quality and firm performance. In line with agency theory, 
previous studies found that strong corporate governance reduces agency cost and 
enhances firm performance (Black et al., 2012; Ghofar and Islam, 2015; Munisi and 
Randøy, 2013; Peni, 2014; Tuan, 2014) and are also in line with signaling theory, as 
strong and good CG demands high audit quality (Wahab et al., 2011a; Wu, 2012).  
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Therefore, four objectives are conducted in this study: 1) to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, 2) to examine 
relationship between corporate governance and audit quality, 3) to examine the 
relationship between audit quality and firm performance, and 4) to examine how 
corporate governance affects firm performance through audit quality as mediator. 
Furthermore, this study uses 1) characteristics of corporate governance (board size, 
board independence, board training, board nationality, board education, audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee meeting, nomination 
committee size, nomination committee independence, nomination committee 
experience) as these characteristics of corporate governance such as board and its 
committees influence companies decision-making as well as reduce agency cost, 2) 
audit quality proxies are comprised of the following: audit fees, audit firm rotation, 
industry specialist auditors and 3) firm performance measures include the following: 
return on asset, return on equity and Tobin‘s q.  
1.3 Problem Statement 
Firm performance is one of the main criteria for investors, government and 
regulators. By evaluating firm performance investors decide to invest in the company 
or keep their investment in the firm. Therefore, companies use some characteristics 
such as corporate governance and audit quality for reducing their agency problems 
and thus enhancing their performance. Corporate governance is of paramount 
importance in the current economic context (Fülöp, 2014). Therefore, it is important 
to determine the origin of the term and to note its essential features. During the credit 
crisis, the lack of corporate governance (Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Haspeslagh, 2010; 
Soltani, 2014) as well as audit quality (Mansouri et al., 2009; Salehi et al., 2009) are 
the main causes of many corporate scandals across the world. All these negative 
effects have generated a lot of questions about the consequences of the lack of 
corporate governance‘s effectiveness and lower audit quality on firm performance. 
Agency theory describes why the monitoring role of internal corporate 
governance and external corporate governance are important. Agency theory 
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suggests that effective and good corporate governance have better monitoring roles 
which reduce agency costs and thus enhance firm performance. Additionally, high 
audit quality as an external monitoring role can monitor the company to reduce 
agency costs and this leads to better firm performance. Fülöp (2014)stated that in 
order to enhance firm performance, an effective corporate governance should be 
based on a combination of internal and external mechanisms. Both internal 
mechanism such as board of directors and board committees, and external 
mechanism such as audit quality play significant role in terms of monitoring which 
reduce agency costs and enhance firm performance. The Malaysian government 
decided to enhance corporate governance regulations after some scandals and 
downfalls such as Bumiputera Malaysian Finance, Sime Bank, the Perwaja fiasco 
and Malaysian Airlines (Mat Norwani et al., 2011).A careful review of  the literature 
showed that the empirical study in the field of corporate governance, audit quality 
and firm performance has focused on the direct effect of corporate governance 
characteristics and audit quality (Bliss et al., 2011; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Carcello 
et al., 2002; Desender et al., 2009; Wu, 2012) on firm performance (Ammann et al., 
2011; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Lo et al., 2010; Munisi and 
Randøy, 2013; Peni, 2014; Reddy et al., 2010). To the best of the study‘s knowledge, 
there is a dearth of research that examines the audit quality (external corporate 
governance) as a mediation effect on the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics on firm performance. Therefore, this study is attempting to determine 
how corporate governance directly as well as indirectly affects firm performance 
through audit quality as an external monitoring mechanism.  
Until recently, there has been no reliable evidence of the characteristics of 
effective corporate governance on firm performance and audit quality because of 
mixed or inconclusive results (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Krafft et al., 2014;Tam and 
Tan, 2007). Some characteristics of corporate governance which previous studies did 
not focus on are presented below: 
1) Resource dependence theory explains the importance of skills, knowledge 
and experience of the board of directors which leads to better monitoring and 
enhanced firm performance. These characteristics will be effective when  the board 
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members update and improve their knowledge and skills by training (Liu et al., 
2014). Training is essential for some reasons such as: technology is developing 
continuously and at a fast rate (Venderbosch and Prins, 2010), training can save the 
organization money and time if the training helps the employee to become more 
efficient (Allen, 1995) and training can be cost effective, as it is cheaper to train 
existing employees than recruiting new employees with the skills you need (Hinkin 
and Tracey, 2000). In addition, Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2012, 
pp.33) points out  that ―all directors should receive regular training, particularly on 
relevant new laws, regulations, and changing commercial risks from time to time.‖ 
According to above discussion, it seems that training plays an important role in 
business success. However, previous studies focused only on the effects of employee 
training on firm performance (Aragón et al., 2014; Mohr et al., 2014;Saleem and 
Khurshid, 2014), and did not highlight the importance of board training on firm 
performance. Therefore, how board training can affect firm performance and audit 
quality is still questionable.  
2) Board education is recognized as board diversity which can affect firm 
performance in terms of organizational outputs. As a group, the board of directors is 
comprised of a combination of capabilities and competencies that collectively 
demonstrate a pool of social capital and adds value in executing the function of 
board‘s governance. Individual education of board members is important in decision-
making. For instance, board members are experienced and qualified as a result of 
their education and they can fulfill their monitoring roles effectively (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). Previous studies examined the education of board of directors by 
level of graduation on firm performance (Adams et al., 2015; Darmadi, 2013; Noor 
and Fadzil, 2013;Vo and Phan, 2013b). However, according to Gantenbein and 
Volonté (2011), place of education in terms of  domestic or abroad may be more 
relevant than demographic attributes in explaining firm performance. Therefore, 
findings of this research can add new knowledge in the literature to show how board 
education in terms of place of education can affect firm performance. 
3) Board composition is one of the most important determinants of board 
effectiveness (De Jong et al., 2014). Both agency and resource dependence theories 
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highlight the importance of a high quality and selective board of directors, which 
leads to better firm performance and demands for audit quality. The selection of the 
board members is the main task of the nomination committee. Andrews (1987) and 
Riabichenko (2014) argue that the presence of nominating committees enhances 
board independence. Therefore, by having a nomination committee, the members of 
the nomination committee can select the best candidate to the board of directors to 
reduce agency costs and improve firm performance.Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) 
and Hsu (2007) stated that the existence of a nominating committee is likely to 
improve the separation of management and control in the firm and provide the 
resources and the legitimacy necessary for committee members to independently 
exercise their duties. Nominating committee members will be judged, more than 
other board members, with regard to the recruitment decisions taken and they have a 
strong interest in maintaining their own reputations by recruiting directors who will 
prove to be effective monitors of management. Most previous studies have only 
examined the relationship between the presence of the nomination committee with 
firm performance (El-Faitouri, 2014; Fauzi and Locke, 2012; Heenetigala, 2011; 
Ntim, 2013; Singhchawla et al., 2011) and did not focus on the characteristics of the 
nomination committee on firm performance. However, until now there is lack of 
study to examine the relationship between characteristics of the nomination 
committee on firm performance to show how nomination committees can reduce 
agency problems which lead to enhance firm performance.  
4) To date there have been many arguments on audit quality such as audit 
firm rotation. What is still not clear are the advantages and disadvantages of audit 
firm rotation. Followers of audit firm rotation documented that in the long term, 
auditors may have a close relationship with their clients which may impair and 
threaten auditors‘ independence (DeFond and Zhang, 2014a; Kilcommins, 2014) 
which auditors report are influenced by the companies. Opponents of audit firm 
rotation believed that auditors with long tenure have better understanding of the 
client‘s system. However, new auditors are not familiar with their client‘s system 
(Brooks, 2011; Dao and Pham, 2014). Among these issues, signaling theory suggests 
that companies signal investors that their financial information is reliable when they 
change auditors and use independent auditors. According to the above issues, this 
study aims to show how corporate governance characteristics can affect audit firm 
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rotation as well as how audit firm rotation as a proxy for audit quality can affect firm 
performance. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The main objectives of this study is to examine the mediation effect of audit 
quality on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. This 
study also seeks to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics, audit quality and firm performance. The research objectives of this 
study addressed in line with the above problem statements are below: 
1. To examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. 
2. To examine the effect of corporate governance on audit quality. 
3. To examine the effect of audit quality on firm performance. 
4. To examine the mediating effect of audit quality on the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The research questions this study addresses in line with the above research 
objectives are below: 
1- Does corporate governance affect firm performance? 
2- Does corporate governance influence audit quality? 
3- Does audit quality affect firm performance? 
4- Does audit quality mediate the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance? 
8 
 
According to the above questions, the corporate governance characteristics 
are comprised of a board of directors (size, independence, training, nationality, 
education), audit committee (size, independence, meeting), and nomination 
committee (size, independence, experience). In this study, audit fees, audit firm 
rotation and industry specialist auditors are the proxies for audit quality. Return on 
asset, return on equity, and firm value are the measures of firm performance. 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
This study presents a comprehensive study on corporate governance, audit 
quality and firm performance in the Malaysian market. This study used the 542 non-
financial (5420 firms-observation) listed companies in Bursa Malaysia for the fiscal 
years of 2003 to 2012. 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
This study has significant contributions to the body of knowledge by 
considering gaps in the literature: 
1) Demand for audit quality after corporate scandals are a main and crucial 
topic in the economic market. Previous studies (Coffee, 2001; Wallman, 1996) 
believed that without audit quality the capital market is ineffective, and the cost of 
capital will be higher. Hence, quality of audit is important in providing the assurance 
the capital market participants required, as well playing an essential role in the 
effective economic resource allocation (DeFond and Zhang, 2014b). Auditing is 
important because it limits the opportunistic behavior of management, which may 
accordingly reduce agency costs and therefore enhance firm performance (Reed et 
al., 2000). Additionally, companies with weak situations are more likely to demand 
audit quality to reduce their agency problems. Most of the prior studies examined the 
direct relationship between corporate governance characteristics on audit quality and 
firm performance (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Cheng, 2008; MoutinhoCerqueira, and 
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Brandão, 2012; O‘Connell and Cramer, 2010; Sanda et al., 2011). However, this 
study will also add to the literature by examining the mediation effect of audit quality 
in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance to show that 
companies having strong and effective corporate governance are more likely to have 
higher audit quality and audit quality would enhance firm performance. Thus, this 
study is significant and beneficial for both scholars and specialists in terms of adding 
new knowledge. 
2) One of the ways that board members can develop and update their skills 
and knowledge is through training. Training of board of directors can promote a 
board to fulfill its role and make a real difference to firm performance. Additionally, 
training of the board leads to board competency so that they will be able to monitor 
executive management performance better, which may lead to higher firm 
performance. Previous studies have examined the effect of employer training on 
performance (Aragón et al., 2014; Mohr et al., 2014;Saleem and Khurshid, 2014), 
however, the findings of this study can contribute new knowledge to how the training 
of board of directors can affect firm performance. 
3) The nature and responsibility of the nomination committee is identifying 
and recommending qualified candidates to the board of directors. According to 
Marrakchi Chtourou et al. (2001), the presence of the nomination committee is 
important for board effectiveness and monitoring ability which can reduce agency 
cost and enhance firm performance. However, most prior studies only examined the 
relationship between the establishment of the nomination committee with firm 
performance; therefore, the findings of this study add new knowledge to the literature 
by showing how the characteristics of the nomination committee can reduce agency 
costs which leads to enhanced firm performance. Furthermore, the findings of this 
research may be beneficial for regulations to emphasize nomination committee 
characteristics in the code of corporate governance because this committee appoints 
the qualified directors which lead to enhance the firm performance. 
4) After financial scandals such as Enron (2001), WorldCom (2002), 
Schlecker (2012), Dynegy (2012), Banco Espírito Santo (2014) and the financial debt 
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crisis in 2007-2008, the concept of independence of external auditors has been under 
question. In response to this issue, many governments adopted regulations to 
improve the rotation of audit firms and partners. By adopting the mandatory audit 
rotation, the quality of audits will be enhanced (Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2013; Lennox et 
al., 2014). The concept of audit firm rotation has not been adopted yet in Malaysia; 
however, there is audit partner rotation every five years. Prior studies (Abbott et al., 
2003; Carcello et al., 2002; Moutinho, Cerqueira and Brandão, 2012; Stanley, 2011) 
examined the relationship between corporate governance characteristics, audit 
quality as proxy by audit fees, non-audit fees, and firm performance. To the best of 
the author's knowledge, there is a lack of studies that used audit firm rotation as a 
proxy for audit quality and also effectiveness of corporate governance characteristics 
on audit firm rotation in Malaysia. However, according to the concept of audit firm 
rotation in Malaysia, the current study uses audit firm rotation as a proxy for audit 
quality and shows how corporate governance characteristics can affect audit firm 
rotation and firm performance.  
This study in terms of valuable insights for scholars will provide managerial 
implications for the government, audit firms, auditors and investors in order to 
improve the regulations, rules and bylaws. Table 1.1 shows the summary of research 
questions, findings, conclusion and implications. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of research questions, findings, conclusion and implications 
 
Research 
Gaps 
RQs Findings Conclusion Contributions Implications 
Lack of 
evidence on 
the effect of 
CG on FP. 
Q1:  
Doescorporate 
governance 
affect firm 
performance? 
There is 
significant 
relationship 
between CG 
and FP. 
*There is significant and positive 
relationship between board size, 
audit committee meeting, board 
nationality and ROA, ROE. 
 
 
*There is significant and negative 
relationship between board 
education and ROA, ROE. 
 
 
 
*There is significant and positive 
relationship between board 
independence, audit committee size, 
board nationality, board education 
and TQ. 
 
*There is significant and negative 
relationship between board training, 
audit committee independence, 
nomination committee 
independence, nomination 
committee experience and TQ. 
Theoretical Contribution: From 
perspective of agency and 
resource dependence theories, 
the result is consistent. 
 
 
Methodological Contributions: 
The effect of corporate 
governance characteristics as 
latent variable on firm 
performance.  
 
Empirical Contribution: 
negative relationship between 
board training, nomination 
committee independence, 
nomination committee 
experience and TQ. Positive 
relationship between board 
nationality and FP. 
The corporate governance 
practices still need to be 
improved on firm 
performance. Board nationality 
and board education seems to 
be adding in the corporate 
governance to reduce agency 
cost and enhance firm 
performance. 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
Research 
Gaps RQs Findings Conclusion Contributions Implications 
Lack of 
sufficient 
evidence on 
the effect of 
characteristics 
of board and 
its committee 
on AQ. 
Q2:  Do 
corporate 
governance 
influence audit 
quality? 
The CG has 
significant 
relationship 
to AQ. 
* There is significant and positive 
relationship between board 
independence, board training, audit 
committee independence and 
meeting, nomination committee size, 
board nationality, board education 
and audit fees as a proxy for AQ. 
There is significant and negative 
relationship between nomination 
committee independence, nomination 
committee experience and audit fees. 
 
* There is significant and positive 
relationship between audit committee 
size and audit firm rotation. 
 
* There is significant and positive 
relationship between board 
independence, nomination committee 
size, board education and ISA. There 
is significant and negative 
relationship between board size 
board training, audit committee size, 
audit committee independence, audit 
committee meeting, nomination 
committee independence and ISA. 
Theoretical Contribution: From 
perspective of agency, resource 
dependence and signaling theories, 
the result is consistent. 
 
 
 
Methodological Contributions:  CG 
characteristics as well as AQ 
proxies are used as latent variable 
Demand for higher audit quality 
enhance when effective CG is 
conducted. 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
Research Gaps RQs Findings Conclusion Contributions Implications 
Lack of 
sufficient 
study on the 
effect of AQ 
on FP. 
Q3:  Does audit 
quality affect 
firm 
performance? 
There is 
significant 
relationship 
between AQ 
and FP. 
* There is insignificant relationship 
between audit fees ROA and ROE. There 
is significant and positive relationship 
between audit fees and TQ. 
 
* There is significant and negative 
relationship between audit firm rotation 
and ROA. 
 
* There is significant and positive 
relationship between ISA and ROE. 
Theoretical Contribution: From 
perspective of signaling theory, the 
result is consistent. 
 
Methodological Contributions: AQ 
proxies as well firm performance 
are used as latent variable. 
 
Empirical Contribution: Negative 
relationship between audit fees and 
ROA, as well as positive 
relationship between audit fees and 
TQ. Negative relationship between 
audit firm rotation and ROA. 
Positive relationship between ISA 
and ROE. 
Higher audit quality can be 
improved firm performance. 
Regulators consider the rule 
of mandatory audit firm 
rotation in Malaysian listed 
companies to enhance 
auditor independence. 
Lack of study 
examines the 
audit quality 
as mediator in 
the 
relationship 
between CG 
and FP. 
 
4: Does audit 
quality mediate 
the relationship 
between 
corporate 
governance and 
firm 
performance? 
AQ mediates 
the 
relationship 
between CG 
and FP. 
*There is significant and positive 
relationship between CG and FP through 
AQ as a mediator as well as direct 
relationship between CG and FP. 
Theoretical Contribution: Signaling 
theory as a complementary theory to 
agency theory. 
 
Methodological Contributions: use 
structural modeling approach in 
STATA to test mediating effect. 
 
Empirical Contribution: CG is 
significantly related to AQ and FP. 
AQ is significantly  related to FP. 
 Effective CG demand high 
AQ and FP as well as high 
AQ improve FP 
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1.8 Operational Definition of the Study 
This study uses three main variables for examining the relationship between 
them. They include corporate governance characteristics, audit quality proxies and 
firm performance measures. The corporate governance variables comprise board of 
directors (size, independence, training, nationality and education), audit committee 
(size, independence and meeting), nomination committee (size, independence and 
experience). Audit quality in this study uses three proxies such as audit fees, audit 
firm rotation and industry specialist auditors. The firm performance in this study is 
measures by ROA, ROE and firm value (TQ). The operation definitions of variables 
are defined below: 
1.8.1 Corporate Governance Operation Definition 
Board of directors: This study defines larger size of board members with 
more independent non-executive directors, training programs, high proportion of 
foreign board members and higher proportion of directors who studied at overseas 
university as an affective board.  
Audit committee: companies having more members, high proportion of 
independent non-executive members and meeting frequency of at least four times in 
a year are defined as companies having an effective audit committee.  
Nomination committee: companies having more nomination committee 
members, high proportion of independent non-executive members with expertise are 
defined as companies with an effective nomination committee.  
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1.8.2 Audit Quality Operation Definition 
According to agency theory as well as signaling theory, high audit fees, high 
audit firm rotation and appointment of industry specialist auditors are defined as 
higher audit quality. 
1.8.3 Firm Performance Operation Definition 
This study uses three measures of firm performance which called accounting-
based measure such as ROA, ROE and firm value such as TQ. 
1.9 Structure of the Study 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, the study 
first focuses on related theories, firm performance, corporate governance 
characteristics and proxies of audit quality. The second part reviews the related 
literature about corporate governance characteristics, audit quality and firm 
performance. The last part follows the hypotheses developments and conceptual 
framework.  
Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed in this research. It first 
describes the research paradigms, research design, sample selection and the period of 
study. Second, the study explains data sources and the data analysis procedure, and 
the third section explains the definition and measurements of the main variables. 
Model specifications, related control variables and a summary of chapter have been 
presented in the last section.  
Chapter 4 explains the results and findings of this study which first explain 
the results of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and firm 
performance. Second, the study explains the results of the association between 
16 
 
 
corporate governance characteristics and audit quality proxies. Third, the study 
explains the results of the relationship between audit quality proxies and firm 
performance. Finally, an explanation of the result of mediating effects of audit 
quality in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
given. The summary of the chapter has been presented in the last section.  
Chapter 5 finally explains the discussion and conclusion of the study. 
Implications, limitations, recommendations for future studies and conclusion are 
presented in the last section. 
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